Espionage, terrorism and transparency

A new report from the Security Intelligence Service aims to be “a starting point for a healthy conversation on keeping each other safe and secure”.
The problem with transparency and open dialogue about national security is that, by nature, our spy agency is limited in what it can tell the public.
In today’s episode of The Detail, Newsroom National Affairs Editor Sam Sachdeva interprets the report, looking at both what’s written and what can be read between the lines.
Most likely, according to the report, a terrorist attack would come from a lone actor who self-radicalises.
“That’s very difficult obviously for authorities to detect and stop,” says Sachdeva.
We don’t have to look back very far to find examples of this. In March 2019, 51 people were murdered by a right-wing white supremacist at two Christchurch mosques, in the midst of Friday prayers. Two and a half years later, in September 2021, seven people were injured when an extremist – who was being monitored closely by police – went on a stabbing rampage at Lynn Mall in Auckland.
So how likely is this to occur again?
The answer is complicated: the report says the threat level has been low since November 2022, but also calls an attack ‘a realistic possibility’.
“Vigilance is probably the watchword,” says Sachdeva.
“You don’t want it to loom over you throughout your day as you go about things thinking that ‘oh, something horrible could happen at any point’, but it is just being aware, I suppose, in the way that you deal with things and look for risks.”
The report also looks at foreign interference in New Zealand, including spying.
Like many of us in more mainstream jobs, working remotely is easier for spies in 2024.
“Obviously, as is the case with most of our activities, a lot more of it takes place online,” says Sachdeva.
He says this was highlighted when the GCSB decommissioned the Waihopai spy domes in November 2021.
“That doesn’t mean they’re not spying, it just means they’re spying through different means, internet surveillance and other digital mechanisms allow you to do a lot of that stuff so you don’t need the sort of old fashioned equipment.”
But while last century’s technology has become obsolete, cloak and dagger spy operations continue to pay a big role in gathering intelligence.
“There is still a human element,” says Sachdeva.
In the report, one case study talks about a foreign state recruiting a government employee:
“Earlier this year, the NZSIS investigated an individual working for the New Zealand government who had unknowingly signed an agreement to do contract work on behalf of a foreign state. The employee was lured by a targeted job advert on a professional networking site, which matched their skillset. The NZSIS worked with their employer to raise awareness of this conflict of interest and the security concerns it raised.”
Sachdeva explains that “there was a politically-connected individual who was approached by someone with a bogus business opportunity and the idea was to sort of gain influence and sort of feed them messaging or get information from them.”
In a difficult economic environment, this type of recruitment becomes a bigger risk.
“I can understand if you’re in that position, you’re at a government department, things are a little bit tough at the moment… we’re all aware of the budget cutbacks… so you might look for opportunities and outside income and it might seem fine on the surface.
But actually if you dig into it, as the SIS did… there is a chance it’s being leveraged for nefarious means.”
Another case study says:
“NZSIS is aware of units within a foreign intelligence service that focus on targeting New Zealand. One of these units in particular has persistently attempted to gain intelligence about New Zealand or New Zealanders. It has attempted to secretly recruit New Zealanders to provide them intelligence to support their geopolitical ambitions. In the past two years, NZSIS has identified people affiliated with this unit coming or attempting to come to New Zealand, most likely to collect New Zealand political, foreign policy and government information and identify potential intelligence sources.”
For now, there are limitations for what can be done in cases like this. The report says that:
“It warned that NZSIS is aware of their activities, they must stop, and that we will continue to monitor and disrupt this type of activity through multiple means.”
But Sachdeva says there’s a distant possibility of law changes that could crack down on foreign spies.
“There has been a debate about whether we need some sort of foreign interference legislation. Australia implemented some a few years ago, there are other countries that have laws in this space. As I understand it the Ministry of Justice has been looking at the area but I’m not aware of any developments or any indications that a law is coming any time soon.”
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